Economics tends to get particular attention from policymakers compared to other social sciences – or even the sciences broadly. An economic perspective is less likely to be overlooked in policymaking than, for example, environmental or social justice perspectives. Arguably, economics is a politically and culturally privileged lens on the world.

Economics seems very comfortable with its position near power. My economics education tended to emphasize that the outcomes of analysis should be policy recommendations. Other aims like theory development, the empowerment of other stakeholders, or some intrinsic values were not as much in the conversation. Whether because of personal interest or my education background, I often assume almost automatically that research should contribute public policy evaluation. Of course, policy is not the beginning and end of all research, but it is at least one valid beginning and end.

Though economics and policy are tightly coupled, growth-critical perspectives are uncommon in mainstream policy discourse and “post-growth” is simply not part of policy vocabulary. As a relatively junior post-growth researcher, I often reflect on the public usefulness doing “post-growth economics”. Few policymakers are asking for this knowledge. Politicians seem to primarily look to research for illuminating aspects of their pre-selected aims rather than finding completely “new” answers. Even if I found ways to get the message in front of sympathetic civil servants, that message would often not fit with the existing mandates of public bodies: raising productivity, improving export competitiveness, enabling (green) economic growth, and so on. Mason and Büchs report why nominally progressive governments (Wellbeing Economy Governments) do not challenge the target and expectation of economic growth. Some reasons they mention are neoclassical economics norms, vested interests, and short time horizons.

At one conference, I briefly spoke about the possibility of post-growth pensions with researchers from the Finnish pension regulator. Having researched the topic without modelling, I find that many aspects of post-growth pension sustainability are only possible to understand with the kinds of case-specific and detailed models that pension regulators (and pension providers) have access to. These researchers agreed that pension sustainability without growth is an interesting topic. However, as a public body, the organization can only spend resources on those pension policy questions that are prominent in public discourse; things that politicians and citizens are most concerned about. Post-growth futures are not that kind of topic.

Research without a direct policymaker audience is still valuable. Though research publishing is criticised for being an inaccessible form of communication, the researchers who do read each other’s papers are part of society too. Pure research publications are one way to communicate ideas and influence readers. Ideally, readers can go on to communicate ideas in their own networks with a renewed perspective that good research can provide. What could be more fundamental to societal change than people exchanging ideas? (Luhmann considers communication the defining aspect of “social phenomena” – social phenomena are communication phenomena).

Still, it is good to have some “theory of change” regarding why a policymaker would eventually pick up ideas from post-growth research. Douglas gives practical advice for policy impact in a report titled Bringing Post-growth Research into Policy, including the following.

• The concept or framing of economic problems as “growth dependency” could be particularly attractive for policymakers
• Focusing public discourse on what “way of life” the state should preserve
• Providing politicians with ready-to-use arguments
• Emotional engagement
• Continuous behind-the-scenes engagement with policymakers; not only when the window of opportunity is at its broadest
• Customizing the message for each audience separately

My favourite part of the report is the surprisingly long list of commitments and communications from public bodies that appear open-minded to post-growth policy (pages 9-11).

Below, I share how I personally understand the policy-relevance of post-growth economics: through the policy concepts of resilience and precaution, and perhaps also preparedness. These concepts overlap, and I think of them as alternative language to engage with different types of policy conversations. I think my perspective is complementary with Douglas’ (more in-depth) report. However, I admit that my thoughts are only based on personal reflection rather than discussions with policymakers, let alone any cases of successful policy impact.

Post-growth economics enhances society’s resilience to crises

Resilience is a fairly mainstream policy concept. I understand it abstractly as an “ability to bounce back”. As such, resilience thinking does not presume any specific values that should be protected, only that some values may be at risk and should be protected under pressure or restored after initial erosion.¹

One advantage of post-growth economic thinking is that it is concerned with very mainstream values: employment, cost of living, public finances, inequality, debt, working life, by extension health and wellbeing, and so on. The interests of post-growth researchers and policymakers already overlap.

One difference is that post-growth researchers may propose ways of promoting these values that are outside the mainstream (such as new central banking doctrines, new social policy instruments like basic income, or new rationales for welfare states). Another difference might be that post-growth perspectives presume that economic growth is finite whereas many policymakers do not.

However, expectations of low economic growth are not controversial at all. Authoritative growth projections for wealthy economies, supplied by bodies like the European Commission or the International Monetary Fund, are today often modest at best.² It is of course still the norm to pursue (green) economic growth, but I don’t think people take fast economic growth for granted anymore. Additionally, Covid taught society to expect abrupt barriers to growth, regardless of the intentions and skills of policymakers.

I think post-growth economics has a place in the resilience conversation. If 1) low / no economic growth can generate problems in many domains of society (I think the connection is complex, but the possibility is real and in many ways validated); and 2) low economic growth is a reasonable medium- and long-term scenario; then policymakers might want to be empowered by knowledge of how to manage a non-growing economy and welfare state.

The specific values of interest – “what” should be resilient without growth – could even be somewhat flexible to the priorities of each government (technical innovation, cultural services…). But I suspect everyone wants certain key indicators like employment and affordability to be resilient against strain.

Post-growth economics is justified on precautionary grounds

The precautionary principle is a notion from (I believe) environmental policy that says that if an action contains the possibility of severe (environmental) harm, and there is little firm knowledge of whether that possibility will be realized, then action should be paused.

Perhaps “being careful” is not a very influential policy doctrine today. Technological innovators seem to (be welcomed to) innovate with little regard for societal impacts if technology contains potential for investment and productivity growth. My government is drafting legislation on a “debt break” (in agreement with almost all of parliament) that critics say could drive austerity for decades; yet I’ve understood that there has been little impact assessment on what the debt break would mean for welfare systems and social outcomes.

Still, precaution is a value that can be invoked in policy and politics. One can argue, as growth-critical perspectives do, that the mere future hope of decoupling GDP from environmental harms (in absolute terms, fast) should not justify pro-growth policy. Maybe this is a bold take relative to mainstream discourse. However, in 2019 the European Economic and Social Committee – an EU advisory body consisting of labour market and civil society representatives – already used the language of precaution toward low growth in their own way:

“…the wellbeing economy must start by adopting a precautionary approach in which macroeconomic stability does not depend on GDP growth.” (p. 3)

The point does not seem to be precaution against the lacklustre decoupling, but precaution against low economic growth generally – akin to what I discussed in the resilience section. In any case, I think this is a notable use of “precaution” in policymaking. The concrete proposal that comes right after is to develop alternative indicators beyond GDP, which to my mind is not the the key issue nor directly relevant to “macroeconomic stability” (these are institutional issues, I think). Still, precaution could be one valid and potentially influential presentation of post-growth economics.

Preparedness?

Preparedness, to my knowledge, typically refers to disasters like wars and extreme natural events or other “external” pressures. Rations of medical equipment and food are natural parts of preparedness, though I don’t think economic and social policies tend to be. The end of economic growth is also not a typical “risk” that would be prepared for. However, the obvious risks like pandemics and military pressures can obviously constrain economies. Some kind of governance is needed to get resources where they need to be in abnormal circumstances. I don’t see why, in principle, economic and social policies should be excluded when imagining how societies respond to physical threats.

I admit that “post-growth economics as preparedness” might be a stretch, especially if preparedness already has an established scope. One reason that I’m drawn to the possibilities of preparedness-thinking, however, is that it is culturally valued where I live in Finland. Since WWII, the country has in various ways had a mindset of “preparing for the worst”. The country is full of bunkers. The military reserves are large in international comparison due to a conscription system. I understand that the stockpiling system to be decent, though it had some kinks during Covid. It would be nice to see this kind of “preparing for the worst” energy also in the domains of economic and social policy. Or I guess this energy already exists, but mainly in the form of austerity. I think there could be space for other crisis responses too.

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1. I have also seen people use the term resilience as if it does entail some specific policy objectives or values, such as “education”. I don’t know if this is more or less common than the abstract conception of resilience. In any case, I think the abstract conception is useful.

2. Notice that EC’s inflation projections are higher than the nominal GDP growth projections.